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Practice Before the
National Labor
Relations Board
BY AARON W. WARNER*
1. Introduction-Purposes and Background of the Act
The present law of labor relations traces back to a shortage of labor
during the period of the Black Death in England. The enormous bargaining power created in the individual worker by the labor scarcity
became a menace to the national economy, and resulted in drastic legislation. In 14th century England it became a crime and a civil offense
for a worker to combine with his fellows to secure higher wages or improved working conditions.
It has taken almost six centuries for labor to win recognition of its
right to organize. As late as 1806, a court in Philadelphia, in the celebrated PhiladelphiaCorduainer'sCase, applied the accepted English doctrine that a combination of employees to raise their wages was a criminal
conspiracy. Even after the complete suppression of unions and union
activity was superseded by an attitude of judicial tolerance, there still
remained a number of hang-over common law doctrines, including the
doctrines of restraint of trade and interference with contract, which,
together with the effective use of the labor injunction, were applied to
excess in the stifling of union activity. As in many other fields of thought
where new concepts evolve slowly from the old-so slowly that the old
and the new have time to exist side by side in irreconcilable contradiction
-a
number of paradoxes became discernible in the field of labor law.
For example, it became possible for workers, who were engaged in the
exercise of their legal rights to organize, to find themselves locked out
and blacklisted. by anti-union employers who, in so doing, were also
acting within the scope of the law.
Needless to say, the economic situation of the worker has changed
considerably since the Black Death. In contrast with the importance of
the bargaining power of the individual worker during the infancy of the
industrial era, the voice of the unorganized worker today is not to be
heard above the whir of the machinery. In 1898, an industrial commission appointed by the President of the United States to investigate the
causes of strikes and industrial unrest in the various states, reported that
"it is readily perceived that the position of a single workman, face to
face with one of our great modern combinations, such as the United
States Steel Corporation, is in a position of very great weakness. * * *
By the organization of labor and by no other means, it is possible to
* Regional Director.
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introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry."
In 1912, a commission was appointed by President Wilson to investigate the industrial unrest of the period and to inquire into its causes.
The commission found that in large-scale industry throughout the country there was a general denial by employers of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively, and concluded that the denial of the
right and opportunity by workers to form effective organizations was
one of the main causes of industrial conflict. It reported that the most
violent industrial disputes of the past quarter century "have been revolutions against industrial oppression, and not merely strikes for the improvement of working conditions." The commission went on to report
that where men are well organized, and the power of employers and
employees is fairly well balanced, agreements are nearly always reached
by negotiations, and it recommended that every means should be used to
extend and strengthen organization throughout the entire industrial field.
There have been many other official inquiries of this nature, resulting in an almost unanimous verdict that efforts by employers to suppress
the efforts of employees to organize are bound ultimately to fail and to
provoke, meanwhile, the bitterest industrial unrest.
One of the main reasons for the existing protection afforded workers who seek to organize, and the restraints upon employers who would
interfere with such activities is this demonstrated fact that in the past
industrial warfare, so costly and troublesome to the nation, has been
caused chiefly by employer repression of workers' attempts at self-organization. For many years the federal government has experimented with
devices designed to bring peace to industry. The National War Labor
Board, set up during the World War, was such an experiment. Efforts to
deal with labor relations on the railroads have had a long history, culminating in the passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which is based
on the assumption that the basis for stable, amicable labor relations is the
periodic negotiation of collective agreements between employers and
strong unions representing the employees. The National Mediation
Board, created to administer the Railway Labor Act, has had notable
success in averting strikes in the railroad industry. In its first annual
report, issued in 1935, the board stated: "The absence of strikes in the
railroad industry * * * is to be explained primarily not by the mediation machinery of the Railway Labor Ac, but by the existence of * * *
collective labor contracts. For, while they are in existence, these contracts provide orderly, legal processes of settling all labor disputes as a
substitute for strikes and industrial warfare."
In 1933, Congress undertook, in Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, to apply to employment relations generally the
tried principles of the Railway Labor Act.

DICTA

31

The National Labor Relations Act was passed on July 5, 1935,
creating the present National Labor Relations Board. The House Committee on labor described the measure as "merely an amplification and
further clarification of the principles enacted into law by the Railway
Labor Act and by Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
with the addition of enforcement machinery of a-familiar pattern." It
should be made clear at the outset that the Act was not designed to
remove all causes of labor disputes nor was the. board intended to regulate and supervise wages, hours or working conditions. The essential
purpose of Congress was to promote industrial peace by giving definite
legal status to the procedure of collective bargaining. Since one of the
most fertile sources of industrial discontent had been the refusal by employers to recognize and negotiate with employee representatives, it
seemed plausible that the removal of this evil would result in a more
harmonious relationship.
The Act provides, in essence, for only three things. One is the
liberty of working people to join or form unions if they wish to, free
from interference by their employers. The second is the duty of employers to bargain collectively with the representatives selected by a
majority of their employees. The third is the duty of the board to
ascertain by an election or otherwise what unions, if any, a majority
of the employees in a proper unit desire to represent them. These, it
will be recognized, are the basic requirements for collective bargaining.
Without freedom from-employer interference and without the opportunity to organize into self-directed and self-financed bargaining agencies, the right to organize is a sham. Nor has anything been accomplished
if employers assume an attitude of mere tolerance toward employee
organization without an accompanying willingness to bargain. Collective bargaining implies, in addition to recognition, an acceptance of an
obligation to negotiate in good faith, with the purpose of entering into
a binding agreement when negotiations are successful.
In setting up the National Labor Relations Board, Congress made
use of the same device which it had used to regulate railroads, communications, trade practices and other types of industry which presented special problems. The board was given powers to investigate and adjudicate
cases where employers, by failing to accord employees their rights under
the Act, have committed unfair labor practices in which the national
government has an interest by reason of the effect of those practices upon
interstate commerce.

2. Practice Before the Board
Cases brought before the National Labor Relations Board fall into
two categories-those which have to do with unfair labor practices
under the Act, and those having to do with questions concerning the
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representation of employees. The Act itself enumerates the prohibited
practices, and empowers the board, subject to court review, to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. The unfair labor practices described and forbidden by the Act
may be summarized as follows:
1. Employers are prohibited from interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to form, join or assist
labor organizations or to engage in labor activities.
2. It is an unfair practice for an employer to dominate or interfere
with, or contribute support to, any labor organization.
3. It is an unfair practice for an employer to discriminate against
an employee in order to encourage or discourage his membership in a
labor organization.
4. It is an unfair practice for an employer to discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act.
5. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of a majority of his employees
in a proper unit.
If it is found that an unfair labor practice has been committed, the
board is empowered to order the offending employer to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of the Act. In no sense is the remedy afforded by
the Act punitive in nature. The statute is remedial. In protecting the
fundamental liberty of the working man, Congress selected the administrative process, rather than that of the criminal trial, as the means of
enforcement. The employer who has acted in violation of the statute
does not pay a heavy fine and go to jail; instead he notiies his employees
that he will cease and desist from interfering with their guaranteed rights,
reinstates those employees whom he has illegally fired because of their
union activities, and agrees to bargain collectively with the duly designated representatives of a majority of his employees if he has refused to
do so in contravention of the Act.
The board's procedure is set forth in the Act, and is amplified by
the rules and regulations. The procedure is simple and direct, and is
intended to provide an orderly and expeditious method of administering
justice. The work of the board is of necessity decentralized through
regional offices. Each region is under a Regional Director, who has a
legal staff and field examiners. The latter aid in the investigation and
adjournment of cases, working directly under the Regional Director.
The board itself does not initiate a case. Its attention is first drawn
to an alleged violation of the statute by a sworn charge filed in a Regional
Office by an employee or a group of employees, or by a labor organiza-
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tion. When such a charge is filed, it is investigated by agents of the board
attached to the particular Regional Office with which the charge is filed.
This investigation is not perfunctory; it involves careful study of the
matter in conference with the persons filing the charge and with the
employer. The objective is to obtain all the pertinent facts from the
parties. Upon the basis of this investigation about 16 per cent of all
charges are dismissed as without merit or as not within the board's jurisdiction. About 26 per cent in addition are withdrawn by the charging
party. These withdrawals usually result from advice by the Regional
Office that the charges are without merit or not within the board's jurisdiction. The very large total of about 42 per cent of all cases are thus
disposed of favorably to the employer in their preliminary stages by
dismissal or withdrawal before issuance of a complaint. About 52 per
cent additional are settled in this preliminary stage; that is, the matter
is adjusted between the board and the employer in a manner satisfactory
to both. These three methods of disposition; that is, dismissals, withdrawals, or adjustments, account for 94 per cent of all cases thus far
closed, and the board has closed some 20,000 cases. This leaves only
about 6 per cent of the cases brought to the board in which the board,
as a result of the preliminary investigation, considers formal proceedings
warranted. These are the cases prepared and tried. The preparation is
done in the Regional Office, except that an occasional case is spcially
assigned to an attorney attached to the Washington staff.
Up to this point, the proceedings have been informal. In the small
percentage of cases which require formal action, a "complaint" is issued
by the Regional Director, for the board. The complaint details the
respects in which it is alleged the employer has violated the law, and the
facts on which jurisdiction is claimed under the commerce power. The
person complained of, the employer, is expressly granted the right to file
an answer setting forth all defenses to the complaint, and to appear in
person or otherwise and to give testimony at the time and place fixed for
the hearing in the complaint. The hearing is conducted by a Trial Examiner designated by the board. The testimony taken at the hearing on
the complaint and answer is required by the Act to be reduced to writing,
so that a permanent record is made of the testimony. Upon conclusion
of the hearing, the trial examiner makes his intermediate report, containing findings of fact and recommendations as to the appropriate order
that should be made by the board. This report is served upon the parties, who are permitted to file exceptions. The parties may also have
oral argument before the board, and may file briefs. The board at Washington then reconsiders the entire record and makes its own findings and
order. It may set aside the hearing and order a new one, it may require
additional testimony to be taken, or, if it believes the hearing has been
adequate, it may proceed to decide the case on the merits.
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There has been some confusion as to the kind of evidence received
by the board at its hearings. It is true that the board, as in the case
of other administrative agencies, is not required under the Act to follow
the orthodox rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity.
However, the evidence received must be material and competent. In the
Consolidated.Edison case [305 U. S. 197 (1938) 1 the U. S. Supreme
Court laid down the following standard: "The statute provides that
'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to
free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U. S.
88, 93; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274,
288; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442.
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence."
The board has no power to enforce its decisions and orders, except
by petition to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals. The right is
also reserved to the employer to petition the Circuit Court to set aside
the order of the Board. Upon the filing of its petition, the Poard is
required to certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire record
in the proceeding, including the pleadings, testimony, and the findings
and order. The court then gives notice to all parties of the filing of the
petition for enforcement and the filing of the record. At this point the
case becomes a case within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals. After the case is briefed and argued, the Circuit Court has power
to make a decree enforcing, modifying or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the board. The Circuit Court is not limited to a mere
review of the findings made on the evidence which the board permitted
to be taken. It has the power to order that additional evidence be taken
by the board for transmittal to the court in addition to its power to set
aside the board's order for any procedural error or material exclusion of
evidence.
The procedure of the board has been considered by the courts in
many cases and has invariably been accorded judicial favor. In the Jones
U Laughlin case [301 U. S. 1 (1937) ], Chief Justice Hughes spoke of
the board's procedure as follows: "The procedural provisions of the Act
are assailed. But these provisions, as we construe them, do not offend
against the constitutional requirements governing the creation and action
of administrative bodies. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville
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& Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 9 1. The Act establishes standards
to which the board must conform. There must be complaint, notice,
and hearings. The board must receive evidence and make findings. The
findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order of the board is subject to review by the designated
court, and only when sustained by the court may the order be enforced.
Upon that review all questions of the jurisdiction of the board and the
regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or statutory authority, are open to examination by the court. We construe
the procedural provisions as affording adequate opportunity to secure
judicial protection against arbitrary action in accordance with the wellsettled rules applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress to
aid in the enforcement of valid legislation."
We have still to consider those cases which have to do with questions concerning the representation of employees. These proceedings are
inquiries into the question of whether or ,not a majority of the employees
in an appropriate collective bargaining unit have designated or selected
bargaining representatives. Such proceedings arise on the filing of a petition, as distinct from a charge. Here again the board is authorized to
conduct an investigation and in connection therewith to hold a hearing.
However, the issues in a representation proceeding are quite different from
those in the complaint proceeding. For one thing, the employer is not
charged with any violation of the Act. The conflicting claims of the
parties relate only to the question of appropriate unit and the collective
bargaining majority. The function of the board's attorney in these
cases is to aid both sides in placing upon the record sufficient information
bearing on these questions to enable the board to reach an intelligent
decision on the record. If the proof as to the designation by a majority
is left in doubt on the record made at the hearing, the board may direct
that the question concerning representation be resolved by an election by
secret ballot held under its supervision and control. The board has held
more than 2,300 elections, in which close to a million valid votes have
been cast.
In representation cases, the board makes no final order against anyone. It determines the appropriate unit, and states whether or not the
petitioning union has or has not a majority in that unit. If there is no
majority in the unit, the petition is dismissed. If there is a majority, a
certification to that effect is made. Such a certification is merely a certification of fact, which neither increases ,nor decreases the rights or obligations of the parties. As a practical matter, it removes from the scope of
conflict one of the issues which may give rise to an industrial dispute.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient time for any attempt at a thorough analysis or evaluation of the board's work. I will therefore refer
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briefly, in closing to Senator Wagner's recent report to the Committee on
Education and Labor of the United States Senate. The Senator pointed
out that in 1938, the first full year of operation of the National Labor
Relations Board under the Supreme Court's mandate, there were only
about half as many strikes, one-third as many workers involved, and less
than one-third as much working time lost, as in the year 1937. For the
first time in a period of eight successive years there was a decisive turning
back from the rising number of conflicts. There were fewer workers
involved in strikes during 1938 than in any year since 1932, and workers
lost less time through strikes in 1938 than in any year since 1931. All
during 1936 and through March, 1937, there were many more strikes
called than cases filed with the board. When the Supreme Court upheld
the law in April, 1937, the trend was immediately reversed, and the
number of new board cases each month has averaged 3 /2 times the number of strikes, while the number of workers involved in board cases since
May, 1937, has been many times that involved in strikes. Equally significant is the history of the sit-down strikes which increased in number
to the peak figure of 170 in the month of March, 1937, and then declined
to the point of relative obscurity. It is on the strength of facts such as
these that Senator Wagner told the Senate committee that "The National
Labor Relations Act has thus played a notable, constructive role in our
national life. To millions of workers it has brought a better understanding of their employer's problems, and the material and spiritual
value of participating in a free organization of their fellows for mutual
aid and protection. To most employers who have given the principles
of the Act a fair trial, it has brought labor peace, and beyond that, a
more human relationship with workers based on the mutual respect and
understanding that grows out of free bargaining between free men.
These employers-and they now represent the overwhelming majority
-are among the chief beneficiaries of the Labor Act."

NEW BOOKS AT LAW LIBRARY
Miss Secrest, Librarian, advises that the following books have
been received at the library in the City and County Building, namely:
Quieting Title in Colorado, by Williams, 1939.
Wills, Hornbook Series, by Atkinson, 1937.
Partnership, Crane on- 1938.
Real Property, Thompson on-1939.
Fair Trade Acts, Weigele on-1938.
Criminal Evidence, Underhill on-1935.
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NEW OFFICERS ELECTED BY THIRTEENTH
JUDICIAL ASSOCIATION
Meeting at Fort Morgan, the Fourteenth Judicial District Bar Association selected Sherman E. Walrod of Holyoke as its president, and
Charles Kreager of Sterling as its secretary-treasurer. Governor Ralph
Carr and Justice Norris C. Bakke of the Supreme Court addressed the
association.
Following the meeting, a banquet was held at the Fort Morgan
Country Club. Mr. William R. Kelly of Greeley, president of the State
Bar, and M. E. H. Smith of Greeley, president of the Weld County Bar
Association, were present at the meeting.

